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SNYDER v. LOUISIANA: DEMAND
FOR JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF THE
USE OF PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES
JENNIFER ROSS*

I. INTRODUCTION
In Snyder v. Louisiana,1 the United States Supreme Court, in a 7-2
ruling, overturned a first-degree murder conviction and death
sentence, holding that the trial court erred when it found that the
prosecution’s use of racially motivated peremptory challenges had not
violated the precedent established in Batson v. Kentucky.2 Although
the Court has previously held that the “trial court has a pivotal role in
3
evaluating Batson claims,” here, the Court found that the presence of
“exceptional circumstances” prevented deference to the trial court.4
In contrast to Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Snyder, Justice
Thomas, in his dissent, asserted that he would not “second-guess the
fact-based determinations of the Louisiana courts . . . . Given the trial
court’s expertise in making credibility determinations and its
firsthand knowledge of the voir dire exchanges, it is entirely proper to
defer to its judgment.”5 Snyder demands a higher level of scrutiny
from trial courts when they determine the presence of racially
discriminatory intent and urges a more critical analysis of the raceneutral explanations proffered by lawyers using peremptory
challenges. Regardless, one must wonder whether Snyder mitigates
concerns that the use of peremptory challenges prevents impartiality

* 2009 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203 (2008).
2. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that the use of racially discriminatory
peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause).
3. Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1208 (2008).
4. See id. (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 366 (1991) (plurality opinion)).
5. Id. at 1212–13, 1215 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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and fairness—hallmarks of the jury system in the United States.6 The
prevalence of jury consultants, who rely heavily on factors such as
demographics in determining which potential jurors to strike,7 as well
8
as stereotypes that individuals have as a result of societal influences,
and of which they are not aware, raises doubts that Snyder will have a
substantial impact on the jury selection process.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Allen Snyder was convicted of the first-degree murder of his
former wife’s boyfriend, and sentenced to death by an all-white jury.9
Snyder alleged that the all-white jury was selected by the Louisiana
10
State prosecutor in a racially discriminatory manner. This allegation
stemmed from the fact that the prosecution used peremptory
challenges to strike all potential black jurors.11 Although the defense
objected to the prosecution’s peremptory challenges as racially
12
discriminatory, and thus illegal under Batson v. Kentucky, the trial
court denied these objections.13

6. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 266–73 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
7. See Barry P. Goode, Religion, Politics, Race, and Ethnicity: The Range and Limits of
Voir Dire, 92 Ky. L.J. 601, 658–59 (2004) (“Fifty years ago, it was widely believed that gender,
ethnicity, and race were, each by themselves, important factors in jury selection. More recent
writings by jury consultants show that these factors are still often considered part of the
‘demographic’ mix, or the ‘profile’ that should be considered in jury selection. Jury consultants
often urge that questions about such immutable characteristics be included in supplemental jury
questionnaires.”) (internal citations omitted).
8. See Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory
Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 160 (2005) (noting that “race-and gender-based stereotypes
almost inevitably affect people’s judgment and decision-making, even if people do not
consciously allow these stereotypes to affect their judgment. This includes attorneys making
peremptory challenges. . . . Once stereotypes have formed, they affect us even when we are
aware of them and reject them. Stereotypes can greatly influence the way we perceive, store,
use, and remember information. Discrimination, understood as biased decision-making, then
flows from the resulting distorted or unobjective information. The attorney exercising the
peremptory challenge will be unaware of this biased information processing and so will be
unaware of her gender-or race-based discrimination. Because she is unaware of her actual
thought processes, she may not be able to completely or correctly answer why she chose to
exercise a peremptory challenge.”) (internal citations omitted).
9. State v. Snyder, 942 So. 2d 484, 486 (La. 2006).
10. Id.
11. Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1207 (2008).
12. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
13. Snyder, 942 So. 2d at 486.
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A. The Prosecution’s References to the O.J. Simpson Case
The defense first raised concerns about the prosecution’s racial
14
prejudice prior to voir dire. At an evidentiary hearing held on July
29, 1996, the prosecution referred to “another case that was on
television everyday for the last couple of years . . . where this very
15
thing happened.” The defense responded to these statements by
filing a “motion in limine specifically requesting the State be
precluded at trial from referring to or making comparisons with O.J.
Simpson or his trial, as such references would serve no purpose other
than to confuse and prejudice the jury.”16 Although the trial court
denied the defendant’s motion, the prosecutor promised that he
would not “at any time during the course of the taking of evidence or
before the jury in this case, mention the O.J. Simpson case.”17
Despite the prosecutor’s promise, during the penalty phase of the
trial the prosecutor again pointed out the similarities between the
case at hand and that of O.J. Simpson by stating that the crime Snyder
had been convicted of made him recall “the most famous murder case
in the last, in probably recorded history, that all of you all are aware
18
of.” The defense counsel’s objections to these statements were
overruled when the prosecutor claimed that this particular reference
to the O.J. Simpson case should be allowed because it was based on
similarities between defendant’s actions and those of O.J. Simpson.19
At the conclusion of his trial, Snyder was convicted of first-degree
20
murder and sentenced to death.
B. Snyder’s Initial Appeal and the United States Supreme Court
Grant of Certiorari
Following his conviction and the imposition of the death sentence
by the trial court, Snyder appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court
pursuant to Article V, Section V(D) of Louisiana’s Constitution. This
provision enables a defendant convicted of a capital offense and
sentenced to death to appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court.21 The
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 497.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 498.
Id. at 498–99.
Id. at 486.
Id.
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Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed Snyder’s conviction and sentence;
however, the Court “remanded the case to the trial [court] for
retrospective determination of defendant’s competency at the time of
22
trial, if one could be made.” The trial court held that such a
determination was possible and that Snyder was competent at the
time of his trial.23 Snyder then appealed the trial court’s competency
24
ruling to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which again affirmed the
lower court’s finding, as well as his conviction and sentence,
emphasizing that the trial court had acted in accordance with Snyder’s
25
procedural due process rights.
The United States Supreme Court granted Snyder’s petition for
26
writ of certiorari. Then, on June 13, 2005, the Court remanded the
case back to the Louisiana Supreme Court for additional
consideration based on the outcome of Miller-El v. Dretke,27 decided
two weeks earlier.28 In its brief to the Louisiana Supreme Court, the
defense insisted that it “consider that the prosecutors selected an all29
white jury as a means of playing their ‘O.J. card.’”
The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, found that the defense
counsel presented no evidence, aside from inferences from the
prosecution’s statements, that supported its claim that peremptory
30
challenges were used in a discriminatory manner. The court
specifically noted that “[n]either remark [made by the prosecution]
31
referred to Simpson’s or Snyder’s race.” In light of the holding in
Miller-El, the court examined all relevant evidence that suggested the
existence of racial discrimination in establishing whether the trial
court’s discrimination determination was clearly erroneous.32 After
also considering the prosecutor’s reasons for striking two black jurors
during voir dire, the court held that the prosecutor’s reasons for using
the peremptory challenges were not pretextual and that “race did not

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. State v. Snyder, 874 So. 2d 739 (La. 2004).
25. Id. at 745.
26. Snyder v. Louisiana, 545 U.S. 1137 (2005) (mem.).
27. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005) (holding that when considering an alleged
Batson violation, all evidence must be taken cumulatively to determine whether the
prosecutor’s peremptory strikes are racially discriminatory).
28. Snyder, 545 U.S. 1137 (mem.).
29. State v. Snyder, 942 So. 2d 484, 499 (La. 2006).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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play an impermissible role in the exercise of these strikes.”33 The court
therefore concluded that there was no Batson v. Kentucky violation
despite the fact that records from the voir dire proceedings illustrate
that the prosecutor struck every prospective African American juror
who had not previously been struck for cause.34 Snyder appealed to
the United States Supreme Court, which again granted his petition for
35
certiorari.
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S FINDINGS
Writing for the majority, Justice Alito in Snyder v. Louisiana,
concluded that the prosecution violated the requirement established
in Batson v. Kentucky that peremptory challenges be race neutral
based on its peremptory strike of Jeffrey Brooks,36 a potential black
juror. The Court reiterated the three-pronged Batson test to
determine whether a peremptory challenge was impermissibly based
on race, and noted that the third prong was at issue in this case:
First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a
peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race.
Second, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer
a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question. Third, in light
of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether
37
the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.

Typically, the Supreme Court defers to the trial court’s
determination vis-à-vis the third prong of the Batson test, because
only the trial judge can make “first-hand observations.”38 These
observations are considered valuable because “the best evidence [of
discriminatory intent] often will be the demeanor of the attorney who
exercises the challenge.”39 Moreover, because the prosecutor’s raceneutral explanations often focus on a juror’s demeanor, the trial court

33. Id.
34. State v. Snyder, 750 So. 2d 832, 839, 841–42 (La. 1999).
35. Snyder v. Louisiana, 127 S. Ct. 3004 (2007).
36. Although the defense also raised as racially discriminatory the prosecution’s decision to
strike Elaine Scott—another potential black juror—the Court felt that it would look solely at
the prosecution’s challenge used against Brooks. If the Court found that challenge to be in
violation of Batson, it would not need to also examine the challenge of Scott. Snyder v.
Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1208 (2008).
37. Id. at 1207–08 (citing Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 277 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 US 322, 328–29 (2003)).
38. Id. at 1213.
39. Id. (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991) (plurality opinion)).
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is seen as best able to gauge the behavior.40 However, the Court made
clear that Snyder is an “exceptional circumstance[]” in which the
Supreme Court would not defer to the trial court’s determination.41
Upon reaching its conclusion that there was a Batson error, the
Court examined the prosecution’s race-neutral explanations for its
peremptory challenge to Brooks. The prosecutor claimed that he
struck Brooks because not only did Brooks appear nervous when the
prosecutor questioned him, but also because Brooks was a student
teacher whose duty as a juror would cause him to miss class.42 The
prosecutor concluded that Brooks’s position as a student teacher, in
particular, may cause Brooks to come back with a verdict that would
not impose a penalty phase in an effort to expedite his jury duty.
Though the trial judge, without explanation, accepted the
prosecution’s justifications as race-neutral, the Supreme Court
rejected them.
A. The Prospective Juror’s Nervousness
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the trial court’s
determination that an attorney who relies on a potential juror’s
demeanor or disposition in exercising a peremptory strike should
typically receive deference when considering whether there was a
Batson violation.43 Here, however, the trial judge permitted the
prosecution’s challenge to remove Brooks without any requisite
44
prosecutorial explanation. Furthermore, the prosecution’s challenge
did not occur until the day after Brooks’s voir dire, which suggests
that “the trial judge may not have recalled Mr. Brooks’s demeanor,”
possibly lessening his credibility as a “first hand observer.”45 Thus, the
Court found that without an explanation by the trial judge as to why
he accepted the prosecution’s challenge to remove Brooks, the Court
“cannot presume that the trial judge credited the prosecutor’s
assertion that Mr. Brooks was nervous.”46

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 1208.
Id. (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 366 (1991) (plurality opinion)).
Id.
Id. at 1209.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. The Prospective Juror’s Position as a Student Teacher
The Court also denied the prosecutor’s claim that he struck
Brooks, not based on race, but due to his position as a student
47
teacher. Brooks had come forward during voir dire and “expressed
concern that jury service . . . would interfere with work [and] school,”
because as a student teacher, he was required to teach five days a
week from 8:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.48 However, after speaking with the
Dean of Southern University, the trial court learned that Brooks’s
service as a juror would not interfere with the three hundred hours of
observation time required for his teaching, and the Dean assured the
trial court that he would work with Brooks to ensure that he would
49
meet the requirements. According to the court’s records, Brooks
seemed satisfied with this information and no longer expressed
concern about his potential jury service.50
Thus, the Court found the prosecutor’s second reason for striking
Brooks—that in an effort to quickly resume his student teaching
duties, Brooks might find the defendant guilty of a lesser verdict
without a penalty phase—to be “highly speculative.”51 Snyder’s trial,
the Court noted, was extremely short, a fact that “the prosecutor had
anticipated on the record during voir dire,” and, therefore, Brooks
would have missed just “two additional days of student teaching.”52
The Court, examining this evidence cumulatively, held that “[w]hen all
of these considerations are taken into account, the prosecutor’s
second proffered justification for striking Mr. Brooks is suspicious.”53
The Court’s suspicions deepened when it compared the
circumstances surrounding Brooks’s dismissal with the prosecutor’s
failure to strike other jurors who asked to be excused due to future
conflicts. For instance, Roland Laws, a potential white juror and selfemployed general contractor, claimed that serving on the jury would
present great difficulties: he had pressing family issues and he would
not be able to complete his work projects, including a home that the
54
buyers had planned to occupy in just a few days.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 1209–10.
Id. at 1209.
Id. at 1210.
Id.
Id. at 1208, 1210.
Id. at 1210.
Id. at 1211.
Id.
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The Court also noted another potential white juror, John Donnes,
who the prosecutor did not use a peremptory challenge to strike,
despite the fact that Donnes expressed great concern that as a juror,
he would “‘have to cancel too many things,’ including an urgent
appointment at which his presence was essential.”55 The Court
explained that the prosecutor’s decision not to strike Laws and
Donnes suggested that he was not “sincerely concerned that Mr.
Brooks would favor a lesser verdict than first-degree murder in order
to shorten the trial.”56
Thus, after examining the third prong of the Batson test, the Court
found “[t]he prosecution’s proffer of this pretextual explanation
naturally gives rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.”57 The
Court concluded that there was a Batson violation and overturned
Snyder’s first-degree murder conviction and death sentence. In his
dissent, however, Justice Thomas noted that the majority opinion paid
only “lipservice to the pivotal role of the trial court” identified in
Batson.58 Thomas questioned the majority’s claimed deference to a
trial court’s determination of a discriminatory peremptory strike
59
except when the determination is “clearly erroneous.” Thomas found
no precedent for the standard that the majority adhered to in its
analysis: the majority decision second-guessed the trial court’s
determinations because the trial judge did not make specific findings
with regard to each of the prosecution’s race-neutral explanations for
the peremptory strike.60 Instead, Thomas noted that if there was
ambiguity in the reasons for the trial court’s determination, the
Court’s application of deferential standard called for a presumption
against a belief that the trial court’s decision was “clearly erroneous.”61
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court’s holding in Snyder v. Louisiana seems unlikely to
answer concerns reminiscent of those previously raised by Justices
Breyer and Thurgood Marshall.62 In Miller-El v. Dretke, Justice Breyer
55. Id. at 1212.
56. Id. at 1211.
57. Id. at 1212.
58. Id. at 1213.
59. Id. at 1208, 1213.
60. Id. at 1213.
61. Id.
62. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 266–73 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–08 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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agreed with Justice Marshall’s assessment that the Court’s ruling in
Batson v. Kentucky would not end the use of racially discriminatory
peremptory challenges. Instead, Breyer, like Marshall, asserted that
this goal could only be attained through the complete elimination of
such challenges.63 While Snyder seems to have been an attempt to
address Justice Breyer’s call to “reconsider Batson’s test,”64 the
majority opinion does not hint that the Court will consider the
elimination of peremptory challenges at any time in the near future.
Snyder holds that when claims of Batson violations are made, trial
judges must be more critical of the race-neutral reasons prosecutors
give for the use of peremptory challenges. It is hard to ignore,
however, Justice Breyer’s poignant words in Miller-El, in which he
noted that the third step in the Batson test is the most important step,
because at this point judges must “engage in the awkward, sometimes
hopeless, task of second-guessing a prosecutor’s instinctive
judgment—the underlying basis for which may be invisible even to
65
the prosecutor exercising the challenge.” The Court’s opinion seems
to have overlooked the very real likelihood that at times it may be
impossible for a trial judge to determine the reason for the
prosecution’s use of a peremptory challenge, even with the advantage
of first-hand observation.66 Critics have suggested that Batson is
inherently flawed in this respect, as an attorney may unconsciously
discriminate on the basis of gender or race in making peremptory
challenges.67 While a peremptory challenge is unconstitutional if made
on the basis of the potential juror’s race or gender, it is an attorney’s
unconscious discrimination, which results from “normal cognitive
processes that form stereotypes,” that influences the attorney’s often
instinctual decision that a potential juror would not be favorable to
his or her client.68 Thus, the attorney’s stereotypes impact the way that
he or she processes information about the potential juror.69

63. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 266–67 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring)).
64. Id. at 273 (Breyer, J. concurring).
65. Id. at 267–68.
66. See Page, supra note 8, 156 (noting that psychological research has indicated that
attorneys are often unaware that they have exercised a peremptory challenge as a result of a
juror’s race or gender, and thus that “the Batson peremptory challenge framework is woefully
ill-suited to address the problem of race and gender discrimination in jury selection.”).
67. Id. at 180, 207–08.
68. Id. at 180.
69. Id. at 207–08.
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Time will tell whether Snyder’s refinement of Batson, requiring
trial judges to more critically analyze race-neutral reasons given for
peremptory challenges, will decrease the racial discrimination that
70
currently pervades the jury selection system. With the prevalence of
jury consultants, who often consider elements such as demographics
in determining which potential jurors to strike,71 as well as stereotypes
72
that individuals are bound to have, one must wonder whether
peremptory challenges can ever be race-neutral.
If discrimination occurs subconsciously, lawyers and even jury
consultants are as susceptible as anyone else to forming racially
motivated biases, and in turn, allowing such biases to influence use of
73
peremptory challenges. There is a very real possibility that a lawyer
who strikes a potential juror may “be unaware that her discomfort
with a particular jury is race-based, [and] might sincerely deny the
allegation.”74 While it is clear that Batson issues will continue to be
raised in courts, it does not seem that Snyder will lessen the frequency
of litigation based on these issues.

70. See, e.g., Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 266–73 (Breyer, J., concurring); Note: Judging the
Prosecution: Why Abolishing Peremptory Challenges Limits the Dangers of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2121, 2142 (2006) (detailing a need to eliminate peremptory
challenges completely to limit prosecutorial discretion, noting that “prosecutors’ knowledge that
they can use peremptory challenges to impanel an all-white or nearly all-white jury inflates their
estimated chances of success, as convicting a minority defendant is easier before a monoracial
jury than it is before a cross-representative jury. In this way, peremptory challenges lead
prosecutors to discount the cost of convicting minority defendants.”); see also supra note 8.
71. See supra note 7.
72. See supra note 8.
73. Camille A. Nelson, Symposium: Procedural Justice: Perspectives on Summary
Judgment, Peremptory Challenges, and the Exclusionary Rule: Batson, O.J., and Snyder: Lessons
from an Intersecting Trilogy, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1687, 1718 (2008).
74. Id. (citing Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed Motives and
Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. REV. 279, 326 (2007)).

